Empirical investigations of the agency costs of dispersed ownership yield mixed results.
Introduction
How does the agency problem of dispersed ownership affect firm value is an important issue in firms decision making. This is so because this problem affects multiple corporate decisions: payout policy, capital structure policy, investment policy etc.
Accordingly, multiple studies attempt to measure the extent of this problem. For example, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) examine the impact on payout policy, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) examine the impact on firm diversification, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) examine the impact on capital structure, Cho (1998) examines the impact on investments, and Lie (2000) examines the impact on cash holdings.
Yet the evidence regarding the impact of managerial agency problems on firm value is mixed. For example, while Lang and Litzenberger (1989) document significant positive relation between the extent of managerial over-investment and market reaction to changes in payout policy, Yoon and Starks (1995) do not find the same relation.
Similarly, while Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988) document a U-shaped relation between managerial fractional ownership of their firm and firm value, McConnell and Servaes (1990) document an inverted U-shaped relation.
One possible explanation for the lack of empirical support for the theory of agency costs of dispersed ownership is inaccurate measurement of the extent of this agency problem.
Specifically, theory suggests that managers do not pursue the best interests of shareholders because managers do not bear the full costs or obtain the full benefits of their decisions. In the theoretical analysis (e.g., Ross 1973, Jensen and Meckling 1976) , the impact of managerial decisions on their wealth is proportional to the total wealth they invest in the firm. This wealth impact is offset by costs of under-diversification, effort, benefits of control etc. In other words, in the theoretical analysis of agency costs of dispersed ownership, managers who maximize their utility trade off the total impact of their actions on their wealth with the benefits they derive. Yet, in empirical tests of this theory, managerial susceptibility to the wealth effects of their actions is not measured by the total value of their holdings in the firm. Rather, managerial susceptibility is measured by their proportional holdings in the firm, independent of how much wealth such holdings represent. In this study, we rectify the measurement problem of prior studies and measure the agency problem of dispersed ownership as theory suggests -by the total wealth that managers commit to their firms.
Largely, there are two types of measures that prior studies use to measure the extent of this problem: direct measures and indirect measures. As explained above, direct measures of the agency problem of dispersed ownership use the fraction of equity that management holds, even though theory suggests to use the wealth that managers commit to their firms. Indirect measures focus on the consequences of the agency problem, primarily using Tobin's Q and, to a lesser extent, various measures of outside shareholder monitoring activity.
We emphasize the problem of inaccurately measuring the extent of the agency costs of dispersed ownership by direct measures. The use of indirect measures of the agency cost of dispersed ownership, however, is also problematic. Consider for example, the use of Tobin's Q. First, Q, which measures over investment, is relevant only to the extent that the agency problem of dispersed ownership manifests itself by over investment. Thus, Q
is not suitable to measure agency costs in firm decisions that are unrelated to over investment -payout policies, capital structure decisions, etc. Second, the replacement value of firm assets, which is not directly observable, is approximated by the book value of the firm. The difference between book values and replacement values, for example due to accounting use of historical costs, introduces noise. As well, the use of historical accounting data may introduce biases that are related to firm age if agency costs are higher in mature, large firms than in young, small firms. Third, the theoretical Q of interest is the marginal Q, while empirically the observed Q is the average one. The use of the average Q also introduces noise as well as potential biases, since Q measures additional factors, such as lack of competition in product markets and availability of investment opportunities, which may be related to firm decisions. Indeed, empirical studies of the relation between Q and managerial holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988, McConnell and Servaes 1990) show that Q is not monotonic and noisily related to managerial stock ownership.
The use of the value of managerial holdings in the firm, which is consistent with theory, is potentially difficult to apply. The reason is that some managerial holdings are in the form of executive stock options. To incorporate stock options into this measure, one needs to know the value of the options as well as their hedge ratios, so that managerial dollar exposure can be calculated. Unfortunately, such data are not readily available.
Nonetheless, using this measure without complete option information may still be superior to the use of fractional holdings for two reasons. First, the value of stock options, especially when they are out of the money and multiplied by their hedge ratio, is typically much smaller than the value of the share holdings (see, for example, Fenn and Liang 2001) . This is also true in our sample: for 220 firms in our sample (25.7%) that have option award values in COMPUSTAT ExuComp dataset, we estimate the fraction of managerial wealth invested in their firm through options to be about 4% of total wealth committed to the firm by managers. Note that this number should be multiplied by the options' hedge ratio to obtain the true wealth exposure represented by the options. Thus, the fraction of managerial wealth exposed to firm decisions through options is lower than the estimated 4%. Second, the use of the fractional holding as a measure of the agency problem suffers from the same data difficulty. This is because one needs the options' unknown hedge ratio to properly compute managerial fractional holdings -percentage stock holdings plus the percentage option holdings time the options' hedge ratio. Kole (1995) results indicate the potential superiority of total wealth committed to the firm as a measure of the agency problem of dispersed ownership. Kole (1995) examines the empirical evidence on the relation between managerial holdings and Q and suggests that differences across studies in the empirical estimates of this relation are related to the average firm sizes of the different samples. Firm size is related to measurement of agency problems of dispersed ownership since it links managerial fractional ownership to managerial total wealth committed. This supports our view that empirical work should follow theory and use managerial total wealth committed to measure managerial exposure to the wealth impact of their decisions. As discussed below, we provide empirical illustration to the superiority of this measure in the case of share repurchases.
Empirical studies of the agency problem of dispersed ownership examine its impact on payout policy, firm diversification, capital structure, and more. We use the context of payout policy to examine the relative merits of different measures of the agency problem.
Paying cash to shareholders, through either dividends or repurchases, alleviates the agency problem by constraining managerial ability to fund activities that reduces the value to shareholder (e.g., Easterbrook 1984 , Jensen 1986 ). This is particularly noticeable in cases of large, lump sum distributions, which is the reason we focus on share repurchases. Moreover, our focus on payout policy is especially favorable to finding that Tobin's Q performs well in measuring managerial exposure to agency problems. This is because paying out cash inhibits managerial ability to over invest.
Hence, Tobin's Q, which is an indirect measure to firm over investment, is better suited to measure this particular manifestation of the agency problem than other manifestations.
Therefore, by focusing on payout policy we are able to contrast the use of both direct and indirect measures with the suggested measure of managerial equity wealth.
Prior research on agency and payout uses Q and managerial fractional holdings to test agency theory of dispersed ownership. In particular, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) show that market reaction to firm announcement of unanticipated, increased payout is more positive in firms with Q ratio of less than one than in firms with higher Q ratios. Lee (2000) further examines this question and shows that market reaction is also related to its excess cash holdings, using not just Q but also the fractional holdings of managers to measure their agency problem. As expected, in this manifestation of the agency problem, Q performs well. Nonetheless, we show that using managerial wealth committed to their firms to measure the extent of the agency problem of dispersed ownership performs even better.
In sum, we compare the measures of the severity of the agency problem of dispersed ownership that are used in prior studies -managerial fractional share holding and Tobin's Q -to the measure that is consistent with theory -managerial equity wealth. As theory suggests, we expect the agency problem to intensify when managerial equity wealth decreases and that an increase in shareholder payout reduces the problem. Hence, like prior empirical studies of payout policies, we expect the price impact of an announcement of repurchase initiation by firms with small managerial equity wealth to be higher than that of firms with large managerial equity wealth.
As theory suggest, we find significant negative relation between management equity wealth and the abnormal return around repurchase initiation announcements in the period 1987-2001. Thus, the less prevalent is the agency problem of dispersed ownership, the lower is market reaction to reductions in firm free cash flows. When we use the measures that prior research uses -the fractional holdings of management and Tobin's Q, we do not find similar significant relations. Furthermore, when we include all three measures of the extent of managerial agency problems in a single regression, managerial equity wealth is the only measure that is significantly related to market reactions. We interpret these results as an indication that managerial equity wealth, which is the measure consistent with theory, is the appropriate measure of the extent of agency problems of dispersed ownership. We also find that market reaction to repurchase initiation is smaller for firms with high media coverage than for firms with low media coverage and that repurchases done after a large rise in stock prices elicit relatively small market reactions. We interpret these results to suggest that share repurchases contribute more to the alleviation of the agency problem of dispersed ownership in firms with relatively high information asymmetry. Lastly, we find that market reaction to repurchase announcements declines with the dividend yield of the firm, which suggests that share repurchases are relatively less important when dividends are used to alleviate the problems of free cash flows. Our results are robust to several modification of the measures used in this study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the methodology. In section II, we describe our data and the empirical results are presented in Section III. In section IV, we report the results of robustness checks and Section V concludes.
I. Methodology
As explained above, we examine market reaction to announcements of changes in payout policies, in particular -unanticipated announcements of share repurchases. As prior research shows (e.g., Aharony and Swary 1980 , Healy and Palepu 1988 , Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995 , there is a positive market reaction to announcements of payout increases or initiations and negative reaction to announcements of payout decreases. The positive market reaction to increased payout can be attributes to inside information conveyed by such actions or to changes in leverage and their tax effects, factors for which we control in our tests. Our focus, however, is on the documented relation between market reaction to changes in payout policy and the severity of the agency problem of dispersed ownership (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger 1989, Yoon and Stark 1995) .
We focus on a particular form of changes in payout -unanticipated share repurchases, which have become a prominent form of shareholder payout in recent years (e.g. Fama and French 2001 and Grullon and . Based on prior research, we expect that the price impact of an announcement of unanticipated repurchase initiation by firms with small managerial equity wealth will be higher than that of firms with large managerial equity wealth. We consider an announcement of a share repurchase to be unanticipated if it is done by a firm that had no share repurchases in the four years preceding the announcement. We measure the reaction to announcements of unanticipated share repurchases by the abnormal return ("AR") on the three trading days surrounding the announcement: the day preceding the announcement, the day the announcement was reported, and the following day. We measure AR as the difference between the stock returns around the announcement and the concurrent return of the S&P 500 index.
We compare three measures of the severity of the agency problem of dispersed ownership. The first two measures are those used by prior research: managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm ("%OWN") and Tobin's Q ("Q"). The third measure is the one suggested by theory, but not used heretofore -managerial equity wealth ("MEW"). %OWN is measured by the number of shares held by management as a percentage of total shares outstanding at the end of the preceding fiscal year as reported in the last proxy statement preceding the repurchase announcement. 1 Q is measured by the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of equity and debt as of the yearend preceding the repurchase announcement. MEW is measured by the dollar value of shares held by management -%OWN times the market value of the 1 We examine two definitions of "management" that are reported in proxies: CEO only or and "All directors and executive officers". Since there is little difference in the results, we report the results for "All officers and directors" in the body of the paper and defer the results for the CEO only to the diagnostic checks.
equity at the end of the month preceding the repurchase announcement.
In our analysis, we control for additional potential determinants of the market reaction to unanticipated announcements of share repurchases. Specifically, we control for monitoring by outside shareholders, information asymmetry and market timing, tax effects, and pre-announcement payout policy.
Large shareholder monitoring is measured by the percentage of the firm's equity that is held by block-holders ("BLOCK"). We expect firms with higher percentage of block holdings to suffer less from agency problems of dispersed ownership (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
We measure the extent of information asymmetry by media coverage and by managerial incentive to time the market and expect smaller market reaction to repurchase announcements when information is less asymmetric than when asymmetry is large.
Media coverage (COVER) is measured by the number of news items in the Dow Jones
Newswire in the year preceding the announcement and is a measure of public interest in the firm and, hence, an inverse measure of information asymmetry. Because the number of media items rises significantly over time, media coverage is included in our analysis as a dummy variable -"I COVER ". I COVER takes the value of "1" if the number of media items is above the median number of reports per firm in the announcement year and "0" otherwise. Managerial incentive to time the market in repurchase announcements is measured by the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding the announcement ("TIMING").
The impact of the differential taxation of dividends and share repurchases is measured by the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax ("TAX").
We expect share repurchase announcement made when the tax advantage of share repurchases over dividends is high to entail a more positive market reaction than share repurchases done when the tax advantage is low (e.g., Elton and Gruber 1970) .
The pre-announcement payout policy of the announcing firms is measured by a dummy variable ("I DIV ") that takes the value of "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise. Since paying dividends is an alternative means of alleviating the agency problem of dispersed ownership, we expect smaller market reactions to repurchase announcements in firms that pay dividends regularly than in firms that do not.
We compare the three measures of the extent of agency problems of dispersed ownership -%OWN, Q, and MEW -using cross-sectional regressions of market reaction to announcements of repurchases on these measures and the control variables. We examine the impact of each measure of the extent of agency problem, both separately and jointly, using the following regression model equation: Besides the main analysis, we conduct a number of robustness checks. Among these tests, we examine our definition of "management". In our main analysis, we consider all directors and executive officers as the "management" of the firm and compute MEW and %OWN for the group as a whole. We check the validity of this definition of management by re-estimating the regressions with "management" restricted to the CEO ("CEO"). We also examine several modifications to the control variables, add controls for firm leverage ("LEVERAGE"), firms size ("SIZE"), and the fraction of the outstanding shares to be repurchased ("%REP"), and examine variation on the form in which the measure of the agency problem enter the estimated equation.
II. DATA
Our sample consists of firms that initiated share repurchases in the period of 1985-2001.
We identify potential share repurchases as an increase in the number of treasury stocks reported in the Compustat files (data item 87). Note that our selection criterion excludes repurchases in which the repurchased shares are delivered to managers who exercise their stock options as the number of shares outstanding does not change in such cases. This exclusion is motivated by the confusion of two effects in these cases -a reduction in cash and an increase in managerial shareholdings, which makes it difficult to interpret market reactions.
We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. In these cases, we consider the announcement of the repurchase to be unanticipated. All other repurchases are dropped from our sample.
We further exclude all financial firms (four digit SIC code 6xxx) from our sample.
For each remaining initial repurchase, we search the Dow Jones Newswire (1982 through 1996) and Bloomberg (1997 Bloomberg ( through 2001 for the initial announcement of the repurchase, going back up to two years from the repurchase year. We excluded from the sample all repurchases that are driven by non-cash-management reasons. These include repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process, such as reorganization, court settlement of claims, fulfillment of contract provisions, etc. We also exclude repurchases of shares between a parent company and a subsidiary, repurchases of preferred shares, and repurchases from a single identifiable person, all of which we consider to be driven by non-cash-management reasons. Lastly, we excluded from our sample all repurchases contaminated by other events. These include repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001 and announcement of repurchases that are done jointly with earning announcements. Table 1 , we report the distribution of our sample of initial repurchase announcements over the sample period. Similar to Fama and French (2001), Sarig (2004) , and others, Table 1 shows that the number of initial repurchases materially increases since the mid 90's. Note that this increase in repurchase initiations follows an increase in stock prices and just precedes the stock price declines of 2000 and 2001. This "reverse timing" sheds doubt on the ability of managers to time the market in their repurchases and on the market-timing motive for initiating share repurchases. It suggests that other motives, such as controlling the agency costs of dispersed ownership, are more important in managerial repurchase decisions.
We collect management holdings of stock in their firms from the last proxy statements filed before each announcement of an initial share repurchase. These proxy statements are obtained from the Edgar database (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) and the Thomson Financial database (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . All market values are taken from the CRSP files and all financial statements data are taken from the COMPUSTAT files.
In table 2, we provide descriptive statistics as well as correlations of the variables we use.
The average abnormal return (AR) to the announcement is 3.14%, which is consistent with prior findings (e.g., Ikenbery, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995). The average managerial equity holding (MEW) is about $74 million (median $22 million). This is in line with Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) , who document average managerial holdings of $66 million, and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) , who document an average value of $73 million. Importantly, these numbers suggest that managerial equity holdings are a significant component of their wealth and not a small fraction of a diversified portfolio. Hence, managerial decisions materially affect their personal wealth and, consequently, their actions, which is the effect we try to capture with MEW as a measure of the agency costs of dispersed ownership.
The averages of the other variables used in our study are also consistent with those reported by prior studies. For example, the average percentage holding of management (%OWN) is 22.4%, which is consistent with Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) who document average fractional holdings of 21.1%. The average Q is 1.5, which is consistent with Cho (1998) , who documents an average Q of 1.23 for Fortune 500 manufacturing firms in 1991. The average fraction of outstanding shares that is repurchased (%REP) is about 7%, similar to Ikenbery, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) who document an average fractional repurchased of 6.6%.
The average number of news items regarding our sample firms is about 58 per year (median 20). While we do not break this number to annual averages, we observe that there is a substantial increase in this number during our sample period. Therefore, to avoid a bias and to make sure that this variable does not capture time trends, we replace this variable by a normalized variable -I COVER . I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value of "1" when the number of news items is above the median number of news items across all firms in a given year and "0" otherwise.
The average ratio of capital gains tax to ordinary income tax -TAX -is about 58% (median 50%). However, the ratio is not constant over time: TAX varies from 40% (i.e., capital gains tax is only 40% of dividend tax) to 100% (i.e., equal taxation of capital gains and dividends). Figure 1 shows the annual variation in the relative taxation of capital gains and dividends.
The correlation matrix does not indicate that any of the variables are too highly correlated with each other to cause a problem of multi-colinearity. Note that there is a positive correlation between prior measures of the agency problem of dispersed ownership -%OWN and Q -and the measure suggested by theory and tested here -MEW. This correlation, even though it is statistically significant, is far from being close to unity -to perfect correlation. Thus, firm size does not appear to be homogenously distributed across the sample. This is in line with Kole's (1995) findings that some of the differences between studies of the relation of Q and managerial fractional ownership of firm stock are due to size differences between samples. This also suggests that measuring the extent of agency cost of dispersed ownership by managerial equity holdings -MEW -may help uncover the importance of these costs.
III. Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of our analysis, mainly regarding the relation between market reactions to announcements of repurchase initiation -AR -and measures of the extent of agency costs of dispersed ownership. Before getting into these regressions, however, we report the relations between the measures themselves.
Some of the empirical evidence regarding the impact of managerial share holdings on firm value concerns the question of whether the relation between value and holdings is linear, humped, or U shaped. To date, the evidence is based on examining the relation between fractional stock ownership -%OWN -and Q and yields mixed conclusions. For example, Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny, show that Q is related to %OWN in a U-shaped manner while McConnell and Servaes (1990) document an humped relation. We use the fact that we collect data both about fractional ownership -%OWN -as well as the value of managerial stock ownership -MEW -to examine their relative ability to explain the cross sectional distribution of Q and the shape of the relation between Q and managerial stock ownership.
The correlation coefficients reported in Table 2 suggest that, in our sample, managerial stock ownership is significantly, positively correlated to Q only when measured by the value of managerial holdings -MEW. As reported in Table 3 , this is also true in the regression estimates that include quadratic terms. Specifically, Q is insignificantly related to the fractional ownership of managers in the stock of their firms but is significantly positively correlated to the value of these holdings. Moreover, the relation between Q and the value of managerial equity stake appears to be linear and not quadratic. This is different from prior findings of either a U-shaped or a hump-shaped relation between Q and managerial fractional equity stake.
A possible explanation for the difference between our results and prior results is related to Kole's (1995) finding that prior evidence regarding this relation depends on firm size.
To wit, assuming that firm value linearly depends on the value of managerial stock ownership, a non-linear relation may appear to exist whenever firm size and managerial fractional stock ownership are correlated in the sample. For example, if managers of large firms hold smaller equity fractions than managers of small firms, a hump-shaped relation between Q and fractional managerial stock ownership will emerge since low percentage, but high value, holdings will be associated with high Q's. Specifically, BLOCK is insignificantly related to market reaction to share repurchase announcements in all models. The insignificant coefficient of BLOCK, which is even in the opposite direction than expected, suggests that monitoring by large share holders does not reduce the value of share repurchases as a means to alleviate agency problems of dispersed ownership.
TAX is weakly related to market reactions to share repurchase announcements in two models and unrelated in two models. Thus, it appears that there is no significantly more favorable market reaction to repurchase announcements when the relative tax penalty of dividends is high than when it is low.
On the other hand, some postulated determinants of market reaction to repurchase announcements are significantly present in the data. First, when information asymmetry is low, as proxied by media coverage of the firm -I COVER , investor reaction to the announcements are less positive than when asymmetry is high. Second, the significant coefficient of TIMING suggests that investors react more favorably to repurchase announcements that follow declines in stock prices than following rises. This presumably reflects investor perception that such repurchases reflect insider views that the shares are undervalued. Lastly, there is a lower market reaction to repurchase announcements by dividend paying firms than to announcements by non-payers. This is presumably because dividend payment alleviates some of the problem that share repurchases alleviate. Since some of the empirical evidence regarding the agency costs of diverse ownership suggests that these relations are not linear, we re-estimate the regression models I, II and IV with quadratic terms both for %OWN and MEW. The results are given in table 5. We find these results as supportive of our main hypothesis -that accounting for the total wealth committed by managers to their firms, through MEW, significantly measures the extent of agency problems of diverse ownership, as theory suggests, and that the relationship is linear.
IV. Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to several modifications of the main test equation and the definitions of the variables.
In the main empirical examination, we consider all directors and executive officers to be part of "management" and measure accordingly the wealth they commit to their firms -MEW -and their fractional holdings -%OWN. This definition implicitly assumes that all directors and executive officers are involved in the management of their firms. The data allow us to conduct a robustness test in which we restrict the definition of "management" to the CEO alone. This modification allows us to examine the possibility that some of the directors are not involved in actual decision making, which means that they are not subject to agency problems. Accordingly, we define the fractional holdings of the CEO as %CEO and the value of the holdings as CEO and re-estimate Models I and II with the respective replacements. Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients of the redefined Models I, II, and IV. The coefficients of the control variables are little changed in their point estimates from the original estimates, albeit the significance of these coefficients does change. More importantly, when the measurement of managerial equity holdings is restricted to the CEO alone, its correlation with the market reaction to unexpected repurchase announcements diminishes and loses its significance both in all models. We interpret these results, as suggesting that all members of a firm's management team -the CEO, the CFO, etc. -should be considered when measuring the extent of the agency problem of dispersed ownership.
Nest, we examine the measurement of Q. Similar to prior research, in the main analysis, we measure Tobin's Q in a continuous fashion -Q. Theoretical analysis of the agency problem suggests that an agency problem exists when Q is less than one. Thus, it is possible that the appropriate way to measure the existence of an agency problem of dispersed ownership is by a dummy variable -I Q<1 -that takes the value of "1" when Q is less than 1.0 and "0" otherwise. On the other hand, since the book value of assets is a noisy measure of the replacement cost of the asset, it is possible that a continuous measure of Q, which is the predominant way of measuring Tobin's Q in prior research, indeed better measures the existence of an agency problem. To examine this question, we re-estimate Models III and IV using I Q<1 instead of Q in the test equation. Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients for Models III and IV with Q replaced by I Q<1 .
Comparing the results in Table 4 to those in Table 7 , we see that the coefficients of the control variables are little changed in their point estimates, albeit the significance of these coefficients does change. More importantly, we see that I Q<1 is more significantly correlated with market reaction to announcements of share repurchases than Q. We interpret this result as indicating that, when measuring the agency problem of dispersed ownership by its consequence -over-investment, it is the existence of over investment (indicated by a Q that is less than one) that matters; not the intensity of the over investment.
Next, we continue to check the robustness of our results by examining different specifications for the control variables (reported in Table 8 ) and by including additional controls (reported in Table 9 ). Since our main result is that MEW better explains investor reaction to unanticipated share repurchases, we conduct our robustness checks by modifying our main test equation -Model IV of Table 4 . We carry the same robustness tests using the regressions with the individual measures -Models I, II, and III, but report only the results of the overall model since we obtain similar results.
First, we address the measure of information asymmetry. In our main analysis, we use the variable I COVER to indicate whether news coverage of a firm is above the median of media coverage in the same year. In the robustness check, we replace this indicator variable with the actual number of news items regarding each firm in the year preceding its repurchase announcement ("NEWS"). The estimated coefficients are reported in the first column of Table 8 . While the coefficients of the other variables are little changed, we find that NEWS is more significantly correlated with AR than I COVER . Nonetheless, since NEWS may capture more than media coverage (e.g., time trends and size differences), we prefer to use I COVER to measure information asymmetries in an unbiased manner in pooled time-series and cross-sectional data.
We next address the incentive of management to time the market. In our main analysis, we find a negative and significant relation between the abnormal return of the firm share in the year preceding the repurchase initiation announcement -TIMING -and AR. This relation contradicts explanations of these unanticipated share repurchases as a managerial attempt to time the market. To verify this result, we replace TIMING with the return of the S&P500 index in the same period ("S&P"). The difference between these two measures of market timing is that TIMING measures the performance of the specific firm while S&P measures the performance of the whole market. Thus, S&P is a weaker measure of managerial attempt to time the market. We find no significant relation between S&P and AR, which also implies that repurchases are not motivated by attempts to time the market.
Next we examine whether it is the existence of a dividend payout policy that matter or the extent of dividends paid. In our main analysis, we account for the existence of a dividend payout policy through a dummy variable -I DIV -that takes the value of "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise. As a robustness check we replace this variable with the dividend yield ("DIVY") or the dividend cash amount ("DIVC") in the previous year to the announcement. In both cases, while MEW retained its significance, the coefficient of the dividend measure is insignificant.
In table 9 we report the impact of including additional control variables, beyond those we use in our main test equation. Specifically, we include two measures of the repurchase size: the fraction of the shares repurchased ("%REP") and as well as an indicator of whether the repurchased amount is declared in the announcement ("AMOUNT").
AMOUNT is a dummy variable that takes the value of "1" if the repurchase announcement indicates the planed size of the repurchase and "0" otherwise. We find that the inclusion of these additional controls little affects our main results.
Lastly, since leverage may be used as a means to alleviate agency problems of dispersed ownership, we add a measure of the leverage of the firm ("LEVERAGE"), which is defined as the proportion of total debt to total assets. We find that adding the variable LEVERAGE does little affects our conclusions and that the coefficient of LEVERAGE itself is insignificant.
V. Conclusions
Prior empirical studies measure the extent of the agency problem of dispersed ownership using both direct and indirect measures. The commonly used direct measure of this agency problem is the fractional holding of management in the equity of their firms. The commonly used indirect measure of the agency problem is Tobin's Q. The resulting empirical evidence regarding the importance of the agency problem of dispersed ownership is inconclusive.
We argue that theory suggests a more accurate measure of this agency problem.
Specifically, in the theoretical analysis of agency costs of dispersed ownership, utility maximizing managers trade off the total impact of their actions on their wealth with the additional effects that their actions impose upon them. Yet, in the empirical tests of this theory, managerial susceptibility to the wealth effects of their actions is not measured by the total value of their holdings in their firms. Thus, we suggest that the agency problem of dispersed ownership be measured according to theory -by managerial equity wealth.
We empirically illustrate the superiority of this measure in the case of stock repurchase initiations. Since repurchase initiations reduce the agency problems of dispersed ownership, we expect that the price effect of announcements of repurchase initiations of firms with low managerial equity wealth will be stronger than that of firms with high managerial equity wealth.
We find significant negative relation between managerial equity wealth and the abnormal Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of 890 announcements of initial share repurchase in the period of 1985-2001. We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. We exclude all financial firms (fourdigit SIC code 6xxx) and all repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process. We also exclude repurchases of shares between parent companies and subsidiaries, repurchases of preferred shares, repurchases from a single identifiable person, and all repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001. Lastly, we exclude repurchase announcement that are done jointly with earning announcements AR is the stock return less the return on the S&P 500 on the three days surrounding each announcement. %OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. Q is Tobin's Q measured by the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of equity and debt. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by BLOCK-holders. COVER is the number of news items in the Dow Jones Newswire in the year preceding the announcement. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. %REP is the fraction of the shares repurchased. SIZE is the market value of the equity of the firm (in million dollars) Table 3 The Relation between Tobin's Q and Managerial Stock Ownership
Mean
The table reports the relation between Tobin's Q, the dependent variable, and managerial stock ownership. The estimated regression is:
where M is one of two measures of managerial stock ownership -either %OWN or MEW.
The sample consists of 890 announcements of initial share repurchase in the period of 1985-2001. We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. We exclude all financial firms (fourdigit SIC code 6xxx) and all repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process. We also exclude repurchases of shares between parent companies and subsidiaries, repurchases of preferred shares, repurchases from a single identifiable person, and all repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001. Lastly, we exclude repurchase announcement that are done jointly with earning announcements.
%OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 5% level ** Significant at 1% level Table 4 Market Reaction to Share Repurchases and Agency Problems
The table presents cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal return around 890 repurchase initiation announcements. The sample consists of all announcements of initial share repurchase in the period of 1985-2001. We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. We exclude all financial firms (four-digit SIC code 6xxx) and all repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process. We also exclude repurchases of shares between parent companies and subsidiaries, repurchases of preferred shares, repurchases from a single identifiable person, and all repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001. Lastly, we exclude repurchase announcement that are done jointly with earning announcements.
The dependent variable is AR, the stock return on the three days surrounding each announcement less the concurrent return on the S&P 500. %OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. Q is Tobin's Q, which is measured by the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of equity and debt. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by block-holders. I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm has media coverage above the median coverage in the year of each announcement and "0" otherwise. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 5% level ** Significant at 1% level Table 5 Non-linearity in Market Reactions to Share Repurchases and Agency Problems
The dependent variable is AR, the stock return on the three days surrounding each announcement less the concurrent return on the S&P 500. %OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. Q is Tobin's Q, which is measured by the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of equity and debt. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by block-holders. I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm has media coverage above the median coverage in the year of each announcement and "0" otherwise. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. I DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise
The estimated equation in models I and II is: Model III includes both %OWN and MEW and their quadratic terms as well as Q and all the control variables. Table 6 Robustness Examination of the Definition of "Management"
The table presents cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns around repurchase initiation announcements. The sample consists of all announcements of initial share repurchase in the period of 1985-2001. We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. We exclude all financial firms (four-digit SIC code 6xxx) and all repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process. We also exclude repurchases of shares between parent companies and subsidiaries, repurchases of preferred shares, repurchases from a single identifiable person, and all repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001. Lastly, we exclude repurchase announcement that are done jointly with earning announcements.
The dependent variable is AR, the stock return on the three days surrounding each announcement less the concurrent return on the S&P 500. CEO is the CEO equity wealth. %CEO is the fractional holdings of the CEO. BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by block-holders. I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm has media coverage above the median coverage in the year of each announcement and "0" otherwise. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. I DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 5% level ** Significant at 1% level Table 7 Robustness Examination of the Measurement of Q The table presents cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal return around repurchase initiation announcements. The sample consists of all announcements of initial share repurchase in the period of 1985-2001. We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. We exclude all financial firms (four-digit SIC code 6xxx) and all repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process. We also exclude repurchases of shares between parent companies and subsidiaries, repurchases of preferred shares, repurchases from a single identifiable person, and all repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001. Lastly, we exclude repurchase announcement that are done jointly with earning announcements. The dependent variable is AR, the stock return on the three days surrounding each announcement less the concurrent return on the S&P 500. I Q<1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of "1" when Q is less than 1.0 and "0" otherwise. %OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the number of shares outstanding times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by block-holders. I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm has media coverage above the median coverage in the year of each announcement and "0" otherwise. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. I DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise. The dependent variable is AR, the stock return on the three days surrounding each announcement less the concurrent return on the S&P 500. %OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. Q is Tobin's Q, which is measured by the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of equity and debt. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the number of shares outstanding times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by block-holders. I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm has media coverage above the median coverage in the year of each announcement and "0" otherwise. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. I DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise. NEWS is the actual number of news items. S&P is the return of the S&P500 index in the year preceding the repurchase initiation announcement. DIVY is the dividend yield. DIVC is the dividend cash amount. The estimated equation is: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 5% level ** Significant at 1% level Table 9 Robustness Examination -Additional Control Variables
The table presents cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal return around repurchase initiation announcements. The sample consists of all announcements of initial share repurchase in the period of 1985-2001. We define a repurchase as an initial repurchase if it is the first repurchase after four consecutive years with no repurchases. We exclude all financial firms (four digit SIC code 6xxx) and all repurchases of odd-lot holdings and repurchases that are part of a legal process. We also exclude repurchases of shares between parent companies and subsidiaries, repurchases of preferred shares, repurchases from a single identifiable person, and all repurchases announced in the month following September 11, 2001. Lastly, we exclude repurchase announcement that are done jointly with earning announcements. The dependent variable is AR, the stock return on the three days surrounding each announcement less the concurrent return on the S&P 500. %OWN is managerial fractional holdings in the equity of their firm as reported in the last proxy files before each announcement. Q is Tobin's Q, which is measured by the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of equity and debt. MEW is managerial equity wealth measured by %OWN times the number of shares outstanding times the price of each stock at the end of the month preceding each announcement (in million dollars). BLOCK is the percentage of equity that is held by block-holders. I COVER is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm has media coverage above the median coverage in the year of each announcement and "0" otherwise. TIMING is the abnormal return on the stock in the twelve-month period preceding each announcement. TAX is the ratio of the maximal capital gains tax to the marginal ordinary income tax in the announcement year. I DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the firm paid cash dividends in the year preceding the announcement and "0" otherwise. %REP is the percentage of equity that is declared to be repurchased at the repurchase announcement. AMOUNT is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" when the percentage of equity to be repurchase is declared at the repurchase announcement and "0" otherwise. LEVERAGE is the proportion of the total debt to total assets. 
